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Consumer Financial Protection and
Human Rights
Chrystin Ondersma†
This summer the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau proposed a
rule that would restrict the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in con-
sumer financial credit contracts.  With the administration and Congress
seemingly eager to pull back on consumer financial regulations, it is cru-
cial to examine the rights at stake.  Many financial institutions have agreed
to protect and promote human rights, so pressure from consumers, human
rights organizations, and consumer protection advocates may succeed even
though Congress has declined to promulgate the CFPB’s proposed rule.
This Article argues that the existing binding, mandatory arbitration system
in consumer credit contracts is inconsistent with human rights principles,
including property rights, rights to be free from discrimination, and due
process rights.  This Article then evaluates the CFPB’s rule from a human
rights standpoint, and explores the CFPB’s role in mitigating human rights
concerns triggered by arbitration clauses in consumer credit contracts.
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Introduction
In the fall of 2016, Wells Fargo paid $185 million in fines, including a
$100 million fine from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
for fraudulently creating as many as two million checking account for its
customers without their consent.1  This practice went on for at least five
years.  How did the bank escape scrutiny for so long?  Customers’ account
agreements included a clause requiring that all claims be brought in
closed-door arbitration proceedings.2  Now that the practice has been
uncovered, customers who were harmed still sue in public court or pursue
class action proceedings, despite calls for Wells Fargo to decline to enforce
the arbitration clause.3  While some states have sought to challenge certain
arbitration clauses as unconscionable, the Supreme Court has held that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts such legislation.4
Individuals have been unable to recover billions of dollars in wrongful
charges because of mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer credit con-
tracts.  Proponents of mandatory arbitration often argue that arbitration is
a cheaper alternative to litigation, but a number of consumers have found
themselves without sufficient resources to challenge wrongful charges.5
One such individual attempted to challenge a $125 late fee on his Citibank
1. Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/business/
dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
J7JC-VVC2]; Yuka Hayashi, Sen. Brown Plans Bill to Ban Forced Arbitration in Wells Fargo
Sales Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sen-
brownplans-bill-to-ban-forced-arbitration-in-wells-fargo-sales-scandal-1475529477
[https://perma.cc/98YN-CF7L].
2. Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Leahy, Brown & Leading Democratic Sena-




3. Id.; Hayashi, supra note 1 (describing bill proposed by Sen. Brown to ban R
enforcement of Wells Fargo’s mandatory arbitration clause).
4. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309
(2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
5. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/busi
ness/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/YR5Z-8LSH] [hereinafter NYT Arbitration Article].
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card despite being forced to arbitrate.6  His story illustrates the tremendous
barriers to recovery in such cases.7  At the time the Times interviewed him,
he had spent $35,000 over the course of three years to contest the charge
that he said ruined his credit— he had yet to obtain any recovery.8  One
woman took out a $2000 auto title loan at 300% interest.  She was unable
to challenge the terms of the loans due to the arbitration clause.9  An eld-
erly, disabled woman also pursued arbitration against Wells Fargo, chal-
lenging a practice of blocking third party levies on exempt funds and then
deducting a $60 “legal process fee” from the same exempt funds.10  AAA
requires claimants to pay half of the arbitration fee, which is typically $400
per hour, so she was unable to participate in arbitration.11  In another
example, TCF Bank engaged in the now notorious and indisputably wrong-
ful practice of “high-low re-ordering” of overdraft charges whereby banks
deduct the largest charges first, regardless of ordering, resulting in multiple
minimal charges incurring $25– $30 per charge, and resulting in consum-
ers paying “$40 for a cup of coffee.”12  Although Wells Fargo and Bank of
America both were sued and ended up paying millions, TCF was sheltered
by its arbitration clause.  Even though it is indisputable that TCF violated
state law, it is unlikely that consumers will obtain redress.13  After discov-
ering that Citibank was charging them for insurance for which they were
not even eligible, customers sought to bring a class action to recover these
fees.14  On the other hand, because the contract they signed included an
arbitration clause that required any litigation to be brought to arbitration—
and precluded class action— Citibank was never forced to disgorge these
profits and individuals never recovered these funds.  Although the individ-
ual fees are small in cases like this, they result in billions of wrongfully
obtained profit for companies when levied upon millions of customers.15
When consumers of financial products do bring claims in arbitration
proceedings, they do not have the benefit of a public proceeding in a fair
and impartial tribunal, and their arbitration claims are seldom success-
ful.16  Even when consumers are deprived of property or discriminated
against, closed door arbitration proceedings are often the only avenue—




9. NAT’L ASS’N CONSUMER ADVOC. & NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., Comments Regarding
CFPB Notice and Request for Information on the Scope, Methods, and Data Sources for
Conducting Study of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements, at 37 (June 23, 2012), http://
www.consumeradvocates.org/sites/default/files/NACA.Comments.CFPB_.2012-00
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL2H-69XM] [hereinafter NACA and NCLC Comments].
10. Id. at 39.
11. Id. at 39– 40.
12. Id. at 53.
13. Id. at 53– 54.
14. NYT Arbitration Article, supra note 5 (noting that Wells Fargo paid $203 million R
after trial, and that Bank of America settled for $410 million).
15. Id.
16. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 23.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 4  7-MAR-18 14:56
546 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 50
discuss in my previous paper, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer
Credit, many of the wrongdoings perpetrated by providers of consumer
credit and debt collectors are violations of rights, and raise human rights
concerns.18  For example, creditors and collectors may engage in property
deprivation, interference with privacy, and discrimination.19
This lack of access to fair, public proceedings and effective redress is
particularly troubling in light of the substantial reliance on private law
suits, as opposed to regulators, to remedy wrongdoing perpetrated by prov-
iders of consumer financial products.20  Arbitration clauses have histori-
cally been the primary tool for companies to reduce their exposure to
liability for conduct that would otherwise violate consumer protection
rules, including those designed to protect consumer rights.21  Although the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has succeeded in achieving redress
for consumers in several important cases, private enforcement continues to
be the primary mechanism for redressing fraud and credit discrimination
in the United States.22  When private suits are the primary mechanism for
redressing rights violations, as in the consumer credit context, it is crucial
that such redress be achieved through due process and that it is indeed
available— in other words, that an effective remedy exist.23  Mandatory
arbitration essentially permits providers of consumer credit to treat these
rights— the right to property24 and the right to be free from discrimina-
tion— as merely default rules that can be circumvented by contract.  With-
out a public forum, due process to achieve redress is not available— and the
requisite consent to waive such rights is lacking.25  Additionally, without a
class remedy or access to counsel, there is no effective remedy to redress
these violations.26  The status quo for consumer credit contracts is thus
deeply problematic from a human rights perspective.
This past summer, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau issued a
proposed rule that would prohibit companies from using mandatory arbi-
18. Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, 90 TUL. L.
REV. 373, 415– 16 (2015).
19. Id. at 377, 386, 416.
20. See CFPB, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU STRATEGIC PLAN FY
2013– 2017, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/strategic-plan/ [https://perma.cc/
XK4X-KXRK].
21. See, e.g., David Schwartz, Understanding Remedy Stripping Arbitration Clauses:
Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 49, 83 (2003) (explain-
ing how plaintiff was required to arbitrate her claim under the federal Truth in Lending
Act).
22. See CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a), § 10 (Mar. 2015), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SR3L-WB6Z] [hereinafter CFPB Arbitration Study] (examining
thousands of public and private filings and suits).
23. One might make this same argument as a matter of fairness or justice; I am
using the more universal and specific principles and language of human rights for rea-
sons I discuss in my previous Article and review below.
24. See infra notes 138– 153 and accompanying text. R
25. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
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tration clauses to ban class actions in financial credit contracts.27  The pro-
posal left room for companies to insist on arbitration so long as class
actions are permitted.28  The proposal also required companies to report
claims filed and awards given and provides for CFPB monitoring of the
arbitration process.29  The proposed rule was the result of the CFPB’s 728-
page study of arbitration agreements in consumer financial products
which found that very few consumers bring individual actions against
financial service providers, and that class actions provide far greater oppor-
tunities for redress than arbitration proceedings.30  However, on October
24, 2017, Congress voted not to allow the proposed rule to take effect.31
With the administration and Congress seemingly eager to pull back on
both the CFPB’s authority and U.S. human rights obligations,32 it is even
more crucial to examine the rights at stake.  Many financial institutions
have agreed to protect and promote human rights,33 so pressure from con-
sumers, human rights organizations, and consumer protection advocates
may succeed, even though Congress declined to promulgate the CFPB’s
proposed regulation.  This Article argues that the existing binding,
mandatory arbitration system in consumer credit contracts is inconsistent
with human rights principles, and then evaluates the CFPB proposal under
a human rights lens.  Part I lays necessary groundwork, explaining the
problem of mandatory arbitration clauses in the consumer credit context,
providing a brief overview of the pertinent legislation and litigation per-
taining to mandatory arbitration, and briefly reviewing the argument for a
human rights approach to consumer credit, as well as the human rights
instruments and bodies at issue.  Part II discusses the human rights obliga-
27. Arbitration Agreement: Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 32829 (proposed May 24,
2016) (rejected by joint resolution of Congress); CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, CFPB (May 5,
2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-pro
tection-bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consum
ers-their-day-court/ [https://perma.cc/KUU2-MVS7] [hereinafter CFPB Press Release].
28. CFPB Press Release, supra note 27. R
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action
Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/business/sen
ate-vote-wall-street-regulation.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/Y3BN-4VH6].
32. See Michael Corkery, Trump Expected to Seek Deep Cuts in Business Regulations,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/business/dealbook/
trump-expected-to-seek-deep-cuts-in-business-regulations.html [https://perma.cc/5S7W-
67QS]; see, e.g., H.R. 193, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfield
Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-
financial-regulations.html?mcubz=3 [https://perma.cc/84JJ-CNVT].
33. See, e.g., BARCLAYS, Barclays Group Statement on Human Rights (2016), https://
www.home.barclays/content/dam/barclayspublic/docs/Citizenship/Policy-Positions/
Human%20Rights%20Statement%20November%202016%20vF.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N9HA-K8SG]; BANK OF AMERICA, Bank of America Human Rights Statement (2014), http:/
/about.bankofamerica.com/assets/pdf/human_rights_statement_2014.pdf [https://
perma.cc/72XY-AGVK]; CITIGROUP, Statement on Human Rights (2014), http://
www.citigroup.com/citi/citizen/data/citi_statement_on_human_rights.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8LH-GPEW].
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tions and principles that bear on mandatory arbitration in consumer credit
contracts, and demonstrates that binding, mandatory arbitration clauses in
consumer credit contracts are inconsistent with human rights.  This discus-
sion addresses both substantive and procedural rights, specifically (1) the
right to be free from discrimination, (2) the right to property, (3) the rights
to due process and a fair trial, and (4) the right to an effective remedy.
Crucially, Part II argues mandatory arbitration places the resolution of
human rights concerns (particularly deprivation of property) in an exclu-
sively private realm without ensuring access to an effective remedy that
complies with due process principles.  Part III evaluates the CFPB proposal
in light of these concerns and explores the CFPB’s broader role in mitigat-
ing human rights concerns triggered by arbitration clauses in consumer
credit contracts.
I. Mandatory Arbitration, Consumer Credit, and Human Rights: The
Legal Landscape
A. The Problem of Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Credit
Contracts
Presently, many consumers of financial products and services lack the
right to litigate grievances of any kind in a court of law.  Pursuant to their
contracts with financial services providers, they are required to resolve dis-
putes through arbitration.  Under the industry’s prevailing arbitration
clauses, arbitration is both mandatory and binding— that is, consumers
have no choice but to participate in arbitration, and, should they lose, they
have no further recourse.  The arbitration clauses are “pre-dispute” arbitra-
tion agreements because consumers agree to be bound before any dispute
has arisen— when consumers are unlikely to even consider the possibility
of any dispute arising.  Further, these consumers are precluded from par-
ticipating in class action litigation, making legal relief inaccessible or sim-
ply impractical when small amounts are at issue.  Because the cost to bring
such claims would exceed the recovery, such claims are called “negative
value” claims.  Sixteen attorneys general have expressed concern that the
bans on class action in arbitration contracts would result in the prolifera-
tion of “unlawful business practices.”34  But the problem with arbitration is
not just that it impedes plaintiffs from bringing claims— even when claims
are brought in arbitration, procedural protections are sorely lacking, as dis-
cussed in greater detail below.
As required by Dodd-Frank, the CFPB conducted a multi-year study of
arbitration agreements and court resolutions of consumer financial con-
tracts, examining over 850 consumer financial agreements, 1847 arbitra-
tion disputes filed between 2010 and 2012, 562 state and federal class
actions filed between 2010 and 2012, 3462 individual claims, and 42,000
small claims. It reported its findings in a 728-page report.35
34. NYT Arbitration Article, supra note 5. R
35. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22, § 1, at 7– 8. R
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The CFPB found that over fifty percent of outstanding credit card
loans are subject to pre-dispute arbitration clauses; that rate would be
ninety-four percent if not for certain issuers temporarily agreeing to
remove the clauses for a defined period pursuant to an antitrust settle-
ment.36  An estimated forty-four percent of checking account contracts
also include arbitration clauses.37  The majority of prepaid card, payday
loan, student loan, and mobile wireless billing contracts also included arbi-
tration clauses.38  Nearly all of these arbitration contracts included class
action bans.39  Three out of four consumers had no idea that they were
subject to an arbitration agreement.40
Of the 1847 disputes the CFPB examined, over a thousand were filed
by consumers.41  Nearly seventy percent of cases involved disputes over the
amount of debt a consumer allegedly owed; forty percent were solely dis-
puting debt owed, while another thirty percent of cases also included one
or more affirmative claim against the company.42  The average amount of
relief sought was about $27,000, while the median amount of relief sought
was about $11,500.43  Only about twenty-five disputes per year involved
consumer claims under $1000.44  While companies were almost always
represented by counsel, only about sixty percent of consumers were
represented.45
The CFPB could not access the results of all cases, but ascertained that
roughly a third of cases resulted in arbitrator decisions, and roughly one
quarter resulted in settlement.46  With respect to affirmative claims against
companies, only thirty-two consumers obtained any relief.47  Only forty-six
consumers obtained debt forbearance.48  In terms of amounts of recovery,
the total affirmative relief awarded was $172,433, while the total debt for-
bearance was $189,107.49  By contrast, companies were awarded relief in
227 disputes for a total of $2,806,662 in award amounts.50  Further, for
amounts under $2500, only 505 consumers even attempted to arbitrate.
36. Id. § 1, at 9.
37. Id. § 1, at 10.  I arrived at this number based on CFPB’s estimate that eight
percent of banks (covering forty-four percent of insured deposits) include arbitration
clauses in their checking account contracts. Id.
38. Id. § 1, at 10.
39. Id.
40. Will Wade-Gery, We took a look at arbitration agreements and here’s what we
found, CFPB BLOG (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/
we-took-a-look-at-arbitration-agreements-and-heres-what-we-found/ [https://perma.cc/
K6TJ-7N64].
41. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22, § 1, at 11.  The others were either filed R
by the companies or mutually submitted. Id.
42. Id. § 1, at 11.
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This is a tiny number considering the numbers of consumers at issue: Ver-
izon, with 125 million customers, had to deal with only sixty-five arbitra-
tion actions, while Time Warner, with 15 million customers, was
confronted with only seven.51
Consumers fared far better when they were able to participate in class
action litigation.  The CFPB studied consumer recovery in consumer finan-
cial class action cases between 2008 and 2012; roughly 350 million indi-
viduals were members of classes involving consumer financial products or
services during those years.52  The annual average of settlement amounts
was about $540 million per year; arbitrators awarded more than $2 billion
in cash relief between 2008 and 2012, as well as over $600 million in in-
kind relief.  Many settlements also required companies to change business
practices.53
In addition to investigating the consequences of the extensive use of
arbitration clauses among financial services providers, the CFPB also pur-
sued enforcement actions against wrongful practices perpetrated by finan-
cial institutions, most prominently Wells Fargo’s practice of opening
multiple accounts for customers without their consent.  Because of Wells
Fargo’s arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, it is likely that, but for
the CFPB enforcement action, this activity would have gone unpunished.
Under the current laws, the bank’s arbitration clauses will prevent many of
the affected Wells Fargo customers from achieving full recovery.54
Judges have been critical about the status quo, with one judge going so
far as to say: “[t]he reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/
her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys
a car, household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or
gets a job rises as a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body
politic.”55
51. NYT Arbitration Article, supra note 5. R
52. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22, § 1, at 16. R
53. Id.
54. Renae Merle, Wells Fargo customers won’t be able to sue the bank over fake
accounts, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2017), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-wells-
fargo-customers-fake-accounts-20160930-story.html [https://perma.cc/SRY4-NFTG].
55. Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1999).  It is important to acknowledge that there is no guarantee that consumers
who are unable to obtain a remedy in arbitration would succeed in state courts.  In
particular, small damages relative to potential compensation might make individual con-
sumer action in state courts impractical.  This is why access to class actions is so criti-
cal.  Some consumers may be able to succeed in small claims court, and some may
succeed in accessing representation via non-profits, pro bono attorneys, or (in cases
where damages are substantial) attorneys working on a contingency basis.  But without
significant reform, many consumers would not succeed in achieving a remedy in state
court.  Accordingly, because some consumers fail to achieve remedy, it is likely that
human rights principles are not respected in state court procedures.  Indeed, others have
written that without a right to counsel, other rights— such as the right to adequate hous-
ing— may not be achievable. See, e.g., Howard Lintz et al., Univ. of N.C. Sch. of Law, A
Basic Human Right: Meaningful Access to Legal Representation, at 59– 62, http://
www.law.unc.edu/documents/academics/humanrights/malr.pdf [https://perma.cc/
T8HJ-BJJT]; Risa E. Kaufman, Martha F. Davis & Heidi M. Wegleitner, The Interdepen-
dence of Rights: Protecting the Human Rights to Housing by Promoting the Right to Counsel,
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B. Mandatory Arbitration in United States Law
Ample legal literature discusses the legislative and litigation history of
the rise of mandatory arbitration.56  Essentially, what began as a congres-
sional effort to ensure commercial entities ability to arbitrate has evolved
into a handy mechanism for business entities to evade legal liability, partic-
ularly in the form of class action lawsuits.  The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) mandates that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.”57  Although the FAA was initially designed to
facilitate arbitration between two commercial entities, beginning in the
1980s companies increasingly used arbitration clauses in form contracts”
with employees, consumers, and investors.58  Such contracts are presented
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and consumers are very seldom aware that
they have signed such a clause.59  Beginning in the 1990s, companies used
arbitration clauses to block class action litigation.60  Although corpora-
tions argue that class actions are unnecessary because arbitration provides
45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 772 (2014).  Although a detailed analysis of state court
procedures is outside the scope of this Article, to the extent that the problems I describe
in the arbitration context are replicated in state courts, reform is necessary in state
courts as well.  Despite these concerns, arbitration merits independent consideration
because, historically, it is the primary mechanism that corporations use to avoid
liability.
56. See generally Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and
Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2015); Michael S. Barr, Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Finance and Investor Contracts, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 793 (2015); Shelly Smith,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer Protection and the Cir-
cumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (2001); Anne Fleming, The
Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J. 1383 (2014);
Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015); Daniel R. Higginbotham,
Note, Buyer Beware: Why the Class Arbitration Waiver Clause Presents a Gloomy Future for
Consumers, 58 DUKE L.J. 103 (2008).
57. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015).
58. Hossam M. Fahmy, Arbitration: Wiping Out Consumers Rights?, 64 TEX. B.J. 917,
917 (2001) (citing Barry Meier, in Fine Print, Customers Lose Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 1997), at A1 (discussing banks’ expanded use of arbitration clause)); John P.
Roberts, Mandatory Arbitration by Financial Institutions, 50 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
365, 367 (1996); Sallie Hofmeister, Bank of America Is Upheld On Consumer Arbitration,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/20/business/company-
news-bank-of-america-is-upheld-on-customer-arbitration.html [https://perma.cc/7JFN-
FNNW] (quoting a bank spokesperson noting that avoiding class actions is where the
“real money” will be saved due to arbitration clauses).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who’s the Predator?,
7 BUS. L. TODAY 24, 27 (May/June 1998) (“Lenders that have not yet implemented arbi-
tration programs should promptly consider doing so, since each day that passes brings
with it the risk of additional multimillion-dollar class action lawsuits that might have
been avoided had arbitration procedures been in place.”); see also Bennet S. Koren, Our
Mini Theme: Class Actions, 7 BUS. L. TODAY 23 (May/June 1998) (quoting industry attor-
ney recommending adopting arbitration agreements because “[t]he absence of a class
remedy ensures that there will be no formal notification and most claims will therefore
remain unasserted”).
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for easy resolution of grievances, in fact most people blocked from class
actions due to arbitration clauses end up dropping the claim.61  Initially
many courts struck down arbitration clauses on the basis that they were
unconscionable or contravened state laws, but the Supreme Court has
since ruled that the pre-emption doctrine precludes states from targeting
arbitration clauses for such restrictions.62  In 2011, the Supreme Court
ruled that California’s unconscionability doctrine could not be applied to
limit arbitration clauses that precluded class arbitration.63  In 2013, the
Supreme Court ruled that the “effective vindication” doctrine could not be
used to invalidate a waiver of class arbitration unless Congress creates such
an exception to the FAA.64  The decision meant that merchants were una-
ble to bring an anti-trust challenge under the Sherman Act, as the case was
prohibitively expensive, with expert testimony alone costing more than $1
million.65  Justice Kagan remarked in her dissent, “[t]he monopolist gets to
use its monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its vic-
tims of all legal recourse.”66  In 2015, the Court again held that the FAA
preempted California law from restricting class arbitration waivers, and
thus prevented California courts from invalidating class arbitration waivers
on that basis.67
To address these Supreme Court rulings and roll back the reach of the
FAA, Senator Al Franken introduced the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA).
The AFA would invalidate any pre-dispute arbitration agreement if it
involves an “employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights dispute.”68
The bill was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, but
has not come out of committee.69
Despite the judicial restrictions on state efforts to curb mandatory
arbitration, and despite the lack of success of legislative proposals, there
have recently been some successful efforts to curtail the use of arbitration
clauses in consumer credit contracts.  First, the Dodd-Frank Act prohibits
the use of arbitration agreements in contracts involving mortgages.70  In
addition, Dodd-Frank directed the CFPB to study the use of arbitration
agreements in other consumer financial products and services and propose
restrictions of such agreements if “in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of consumers.”71  In March 2015, the CFPB completed and published
its three-year study.72  The study found that pre-dispute arbitration agree-
61. NYT Arbitration Article, supra note 5. R
62. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); American Express Co.
v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
63. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344.
64. American Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
65. Id.; NYT Arbitration Article, supra note 5. R
66. American Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
67. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015).
68. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S.1133, 114th Cong. (2015).
69. Id.
70. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639(c)(e) (2010).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b).
72. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22. R
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ments were being widely used to prevent consumers from seeking relief
from legal violations on a class basis, and that, without this option, con-
sumers rarely file individual lawsuits or arbitration cases to obtain relief,
particularly for negative value claims.73
C. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposal
Section 1028(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes CFPB to issue regu-
lations that would “prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use
of an agreement between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute
between the parties,” if doing so is “in the public interest and for the pro-
tection of consumers.  The CFPB proposed to establish 12 CFR part 1040,
which has two primary functions: first, it would prohibit mandatory arbi-
tration agreements from barring class actions, and second, it would pro-
vide for CFPB monitoring of arbitration of disputes involving consumer
financial products and services.74
First, the proposed § 1040.4 would prohibit covered providers of con-
sumer financial products and services from using an arbitration agreement
to bar the consumer from filing or participating in class action litigation.
The CFPB concluded that allowing consumers to seek relief in class actions
would strengthen the incentives for companies to avoid potentially illegal
activities, and would also reduce the likelihood that consumers would be
subject to such practices in the first instance.75  The CFPB also explained
that the rule would help level the playing field between compliance-ori-
ented providers and those seeking to eschew liability.76
Consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed rule would have
applied only to agreements entered into after the end of the 180-day period
beginning on the regulation’s effective date.77  The effective days of the rule
would have been thirty days after publication in the Federal Register.78
After the effective date, arbitration agreements would have had to include
specific language explaining the effect of the new rule.79  The regulation
would have applied to those providers of consumer financial products and
services over which they have jurisdiction; this includes credit card compa-
nies, debt management service providers, payday lenders, title lenders, stu-
dent loan companies, and debt collection agencies.80  (It would not include
73. Id.
74. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040 at 1 (proposed May 3, 2016), http://
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/CFPB_Arbitration_Agreements_Notice_of_Pro
posed_Rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C3G-BHJP].
75. Id. at 115.
76. Id. at 127.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id.
79. Id. The proposal would also permit providers of general-purpose reloadable pre-
paid cards to continue selling packages that contain non-compliant arbitration agree-
ments, if they give consumers a compliant agreement as soon as consumers register their
cards and the providers comply with the proposed rule’s requirement not to use an arbi-
tration agreement to block a class action. Id. at 5– 6.
80. Id. at 183– 84.
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auto dealerships, although automobile leases would be covered.)81
In addition to banning class action in arbitration agreements for cov-
ered consumer financial contracts, the regulation also would have provided
for CFPB monitoring of arbitration.  Section 1040.4(b) would require a cov-
ered provider that is involved in an arbitration pursuant to a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement to submit specified arbitral records to CFPB.82
Although the CFPB explained that it was not seeking to restrict the use of
arbitration agreements or prescribe specific methods or standards for the
adjudication of arbitrations, it would require covered providers to submit
five types of documents with respect to any individual arbitration case: (1)
the initial claim and counterclaim, (2) the arbitration agreement, (3) the
arbitration award issued (if any), (4) communication regarding claim dis-
missal due to the failure to pay fees, and (5) communication regarding a
determination that agreement “does not comply with the administrator’s
fairness principles.”83  The CFPB explained that intended to use the infor-
mation it collects to continue monitoring arbitration proceedings to deter-
mine whether there are developments that raise consumer protection
concerns warranting further CFPB action.84  In addition, the CFPB would
have published these materials on its website increase the transparency of
the arbitration of consumer disputes.85
Unsurprisingly, industry groups opposed the CFPB’s proposed rules:
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce insisted that government enforcement is
sufficient to protect consumers,86 despite the CFPB’s findings that many
class actions provided redress in situations where there was no public
enforcement.87  The Chamber of Commerce also insisted that arbitration
was beneficial and accessible (despite the CFPB’s evidence to the contrary),
and that consumers would pay more if the CFPB proposal goes into
effect.88  The Consumer Bankers Association also opposed the regula-
tion,89 and even credit unions expressed opposition.90  On October 24, the
81. Id. at 183, 200.
82. Id. at 201.
83. Id. at 340; 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(b)(1) (2017).
84. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22, at 4. R
85. Id.
86. The CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration “Study,” U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 8– 9 (Mar. 8,
2016), https://www.uschamber.com/issue-brief/the-cfpb-s-flawed-arbitration-study
[https://perma.cc/UP4D-6QU5] [hereinafter CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration Study].
87. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (proposed May 3, 2016), at 77.
88. CFPB’s Flawed Arbitration Study, supra note 86, at 8– 10, 12, 15– 16, 18 (citing, R
Stephen J. Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements— With Particular
Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 254– 57 (2006)).
89. Maggie Seidel, CBA Statement on the CFPB’s Proposed Arbitration Rule, CONSUMER
BANKERS ASS’N (May 5, 2016), http://consumerbankers.com/cba-media-center/media-
releases/cba-statement-cfpb%E2%80%99s-proposed-arbitration-rule [https://perma.cc/
JN8G-TLJL] (“Arbitration has long provided a faster, better, and more cost-effective
means of addressing consumer disputes than litigation or class action lawsuits . . . . It is
unfortunate this pre-baked proposal is political rather than substantive.”).
90. Christine Hines & Sophia Huang, Credit Union Opposition to CFPB Arbitration
Plan Is Baffling, AM. BANKER (July 14, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/bank
think/credit-union-opposition-to-cfpb-arbitration-plan-is-baffling-1090173-1.html
[https://perma.cc/RF4R-9V23].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\50-3\CIN304.txt unknown Seq: 13  7-MAR-18 14:56
2017 Consumer Financial Protection and Human Rights 555
Senate voted 51-50 to disapprove the rule under the Congressional Review
Act.  On November 1, President Trump signed the resolution, so the pro-
posed rule cannot take effect.
D. A Brief Introduction to Human Rights
In my previous two papers,91 I explored the possibility of using a
human rights framework to approach issues related to debt relief and over-
indebtedness.  In A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief,92 I identified
human rights principles implicated in debt relief, including bankruptcy
and insolvency regimes.  In A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit, I
presented normative arguments in favor of a human rights approach to
problems related to consumer credit.93  I argued that a consumer protec-
tion approach, which has historically focused on leveling the playing field
between consumers and lenders, was insufficient to address concerns of
consumer confusion and consumer desperation.  A human rights
approach, I argued, could provide a floor of protection that cannot be cir-
cumvented on economic efficiency grounds.  Although, in theory, a doc-
trine like unconscionability could accomplish something similar,
arguments based on unconscionability have not been successful in chal-
lenging unfair consumer credit contracts.  In addition, a human rights lens
has the virtue of being universally comprehensible— it is perhaps the only
universal language other than economics, and a purely economic lens has
not been up to the task of preventing significant harm to consumers.  A
human rights based analysis is also useful because it is applicable to any
proposed consumer financial product or regulation in any country; in an
era of globalization where many contracts and consumer financial prod-
ucts may cross country lines, this universal applicability can be particu-
larly beneficial.  Finally, companies do not want to be human rights
violators.  To the extent that a consumer financial product or practice is
inconsistent with human rights principles, advocates may succeed in pres-
suring companies to change such practices.  My goal, in proposing a
human rights lens, was twofold: first, for human rights advocates to con-
sider consumer credit issues— and they have been doing impressive work in
this field; and second, for folks working on consumer credit issues to con-
sider whether legislative proposals and the like are consistent with human
rights principles, and to advocate accordingly.
There is good reason to aim human rights principles at mandatory
arbitration in the consumer credit context.  As discussed in the introduc-
tion, private enforcement is the primary way of redressing deprivation of
rights, such as property rights and the right to be free from discrimination.
Mandatory arbitration has essentially permitted businesses to treat these
rights as merely default rules that can be avoided contractually, even when
the contract is hardly a meeting of minds.  While in theory there is a mech-
91. See generally Ondersma, supra note 18; Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights R
Framework for Debt Relief, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 269 (2014).
92. Ondersma, supra note 91. R
93. Id.
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anism for holding businesses accountable for these violations, that remedy
is not effective and lacks due process protections, as I will discuss.
As I have explained in previous articles, a human rights approach to
consumer credit does not consist only (or even primarily) of identifying
human rights obligations connected to a remedy that is securable in a
human rights forum; rather, it also entails identifying accepted human
rights principles and methods of promoting these principles as they relate
to consumer credit concerns.  Courts, legislatures, policymakers, and activ-
ists can cite to these rights and principles in advocating for legislative or
policy proposals.  Even where a treaty has been signed but not ratified, as
in the case of the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural, and
Social Rights (ICESCR), the broad recognition of such rights can be a pow-
erful driver for legislative change.94  Thus, it is useful to examine human
rights instruments that have been broadly accepted.  These include the
International Bill of Human Rights, which includes the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the ICESCR, as well as the human rights
instruments adopted by regional bodies that have undertaken human
rights obligations.
1. Human Rights Instruments of the United Nations
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes civil and politi-
cal rights as well as the “economic, social and cultural rights indispensable
for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”95  While not a
treaty, the Declaration is referenced in the preamble to treaties subse-
quently enacted and is considered part of “customary” international law.96
The Declaration affirms the right to “just and favorable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity,
and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.”97  In
addition, it enunciates a right to rest and leisure,98 and the right to “a stan-
94. For example, the right to water that advocates in Detroit cited is also a right
contained in the ICESCR.  For countries that are signatories to the ICESCR, even more
pressure can be applied, as governments are required to “progressively realize” the rights
contained in the ICESCR.
95. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A.
Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 75 (1948).
96. ANTHONY D’AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS 123– 47 (1986);
John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact and
Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
21, 36– 37 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY
273– 74, 325– 27 (1980); MYERS S. MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 273– 74, 325– 27
(1980); Louis B. Sohn, The Human Rights Law of the Charter, 12 TEX. INT’L L.J. 129, 133
(1977).  In addition, the 1968 United Nations International Conference on Human
Rights stated that the Declaration “constitutes an obligation for the members of the
international community.”  The International Conference of Human Rights, Final Act of
the International Conference on Human Rights, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/41 (1968).
97. Universal Declaration, supra note 95. R
98. Id.
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dard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care[.]”99
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, protects indi-
viduals’ civil and political rights, including rights to life,100 freedom of
religion,101 expression,102 and assembly.103  It also includes the right to
privacy,104 freedom from discrimination,105 and freedom from involun-
tary servitude or forced labor.106  The United States has signed and rati-
fied the ICCPR.107  All parties to the ICCPR Parties to the ICCPR submit to
monitoring by the United Nations Human Rights Committee.108  On the
other hand, redress for human rights violations under the ICCPR is availa-
ble only pursuant to the First Optional Protocol, which the United States
has not adopted.109  The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights protects the rights to education, health, and an adequate
standard of living, which includes food, clothing, and housing.110  The
Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights recognizes that imme-
diate guarantee of each of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR may not be
feasible; parties nevertheless must “take steps” toward realizing the rights,
and must provide “minimum essential levels” of each of the rights.111  The
U.S. signed but has not ratified the ICESCR.112
2. Human Rights and the Inter-American System
In addition to its commitments to the United Nations, the United
States has also acknowledged human rights obligations as a member of the
Organization of American States in the Inter-American System.  The United
99. Id. at 76.
100. Id; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), annex, International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, at art. 6 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
101. ICCPR, supra note 100, at art. 18. R
102. Id. at art. 19.
103. Id. at art. 21.
104. Id. at art. 17.
105. Id. at art. 26.
106. Id. at art. 8.
107. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by the
U.S. Oct. 5, 1977, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=
treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-4&chapter=4&lang=en [https://perma.cc/GS4N-6N63].  The
United States signed the ICCPR in 1977 and ratified it in 1992.
108. Id.
109. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, at 59– 60 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
110. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) Annex, at 50.
111. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, Rep. on the Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/
C.12/1990/8, at 84– 85 (1991).
112. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, signed by the
U.S. Oct. 5, 1977, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?
src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&clang=_en [https://perma.cc/MEB5-DSPG].  Pur-
suant to the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights can consider complaints from individuals, but only those individuals
from the ten countries who have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR.  Optional
Protocol, supra note 109. R
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States has signed the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man as well as the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR).113
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man includes civil
and political rights as well as economic, social and cultural rights, includ-
ing property, work, leisure, and social security.114  Under the Declaration,
these rights can be limited by the “just demands of the general welfare in a
democratic society.”115  The later signed American Convention on Human
Rights enshrines in more detail civil and political rights including the right
to life,116 humane treatment,117 freedom from slavery,118 right to lib-
erty,119 right to privacy,120 and the right to property.121  In addition, par-
ties agree to “adopt measures . . . with a view to achieving progressively, by
legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization of the rights
implicit in the economic, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
Charter of the Organization of American States[.]”122  The U.S. signed but
did not ratify the ACHR.  The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) oversees petitions alleging human rights abuses by an OAS
member; such petitions are limited to widespread human rights violations
(general petition) or a specific incident or practice affecting numerous vic-
tims (collective petition).123  The IACHR first determines whether the
member state is at fault; if so, it makes a list of recommendations for the
member state to cure.124  If the member state fails to cure, the case may
proceed to the Inter-American Court— but only states that have recognized
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court may bring a case in front of
it.125  Although several states have recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court; the United States has not.
113. The following twenty-one nations initially signed the OAS Charter in 1948:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba1, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  The following fourteen
nations joined subsequently: Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago (1967); Jamaica (1969);
Grenada (1975); Suriname (1977); Dominica (Commonwealth of), Saint Lucia (1979);
Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1981); The Bahamas (Com-
monwealth of) (1982); St. Kitts & Nevis (1984); Canada (1990); Belize and Guyana
(1991).  Member States, Who We Are, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/about/member_
states.asp [https://perma.cc/DN2E-G77N].
114. OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX art.
1– 28, OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc. 6 rev 1 (1948), http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/
English/Basic2.american%20Declaration.htm [https://perma.cc/EP7A-VCV7].
115. Id. art. 28.
116. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 4,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
117. Id. art. 5.
118. Id. art. 6.
119. Id. art. 7.
120. Id. art. 11.
121. Id. art. 21.
122. Id. art. 26.
123. Id. art. 41.
124. Id. art. 51 § 2.
125. Id. art. 61 § 2, art. 62 § 3.
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3. The European System
The United States is obviously not a part of the European human
rights system, but the European Court of Human Rights has the most well-
developed jurisprudence and other human rights bodies often look to this
jurisprudence in interpreting their own human rights instruments.126  All
Council of Europe member states127 are bound by the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR).  The ECHR protects civil and political
rights128 such as life,129 liberty,130 fair trial,131 and privacy,132 freedom
from servitude133 and freedom from discrimination.134  Additionally, the
ECHR provides for a right to property135 and a right to education.136  The
European Court of Human Rights is responsible for adjudicating alleged
violations of the ECHR, and individuals, organizations, or contracting
nations (on behalf of their citizens) may bring claims to the European
Court of Human Rights.137
II. Human Rights Pertaining to Mandatory Arbitration
Arbitration clauses interfere with consumers’ rights to property and
rights to be free from discrimination.  In addition, arbitration clauses
deprive consumers of due process in the adjudication of these rights, and
deprive consumers of an effective remedy in which to vindicate these
rights.  This part applies these human rights principles— the right to prop-
erty, the right to be free from discrimination, the right to due process, and
the right to an effective remedy— to the context of mandatory arbitration in
consumer credit agreements.
126. Lorna McGregor, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Human Rights: Developing a
Rights-Based Approach Through the ECHR, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 607, 609 (2015).
127. The member states include: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Monaco,
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San
Marino, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, “The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. See Exhibition on
50 Years of the Court: The 47 Member States, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://echr.coe.int/
Documents/2010_Expo_50years_02_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/KJU5-6GZV].
128. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
arts. 1– 18, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Con-
vention_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5BS-MCDR] [hereinafter ECHR].
129. Id. at 6 (art. 2).
130. Id. at 7 (art. 5).
131. Id. at 9 (art. 6).
132. Id. at 10 (art. 8).
133. Id. at 7 (art. 4).
134. Id. at 12 (art. 14).
135. Id. at 31 (Protocol 1, art. 1).
136. Id. at 32 (Protocol 1, art. 2); see also Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Eur.,
Resolution 1031 (1994) on the Honoring of Commitments Entered into by Member States
When Joining the Council of Europe (1994).
137. Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AZF5-YQ7A].
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A. Right to Property
1. The Human Right to Property Generally
Several human rights instruments include a right to property.138
Although property rights are not included in either the ICCPR or the
ICESCR, Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides
for the “right to own property” and asserts and that “[n]o one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.” In addition, while the right to prop-
erty is not enforced by any U.N. body, the ECHR and ACHR both protect
the right to property.139  According to Article 1 of the first Protocol to the
ECHR, “every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions.  No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by
the general principles of international law.”140  Pursuant to Article 21 of
the ACHR, individuals shall have the right to “use and enjoyment” of prop-
erty— but such right can be subordinated to “the interest of society.”141
Deprivation of property is permitted only upon “just compensation” and
only “for reasons of public utility or social interest . . . according to the
forms established by law.”142
As I explained in an earlier paper, the European system and Inter-
American system have established a broad concept of property under
human rights jurisprudence.  Under EU human rights law, “possessions”
include both existing possessions and possessions in which an individual
has a “ ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining effective enjoyment of a prop-
erty right.”143  Future income can even be a property interest if an individ-
ual has an “enforceable claim” to the income.144  In addition, if a national
law provides for welfare payments as a matter of right, the payments are
property interests protected by Article 1.145  Even a mere judgment creditor
is considered to have a property interest at the moment when it is “suffi-
138. See generally Christoph Schreuer & Ursula Kriebaum, The Concept of Property in
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS DEMOCRACY AND
THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 743, 744– 45, 754– 55 (Stephan
Breitenmoser et al. eds., 2007).
139. ECHR, supra note 128, at 31 (Protocol 1, art. 1); ACHR, supra note 116, at art. R
21; see also Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/ rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 art. 21 (protect-
ing the right to property).  In addition, of course, many nations’ constitutions protect
property rights as well. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
140. ECHR, supra note 128, at 6 (art. 1). R
141. ACHR, supra note 116, art. 21(1). R
142. Id. art. 21(2).
143. Kopecký v. Slovakia, 2004-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 125, 139– 40 (citing Prince Hans-
Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, 2001-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1); see also Gratzinger &
Gratzingerova v. Czech Republic, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 399, 401– 02.
144. Ian Edgar (Liverpool) Ltd. v. United Kingdom, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 465, 475; see
also Wendenburg v. Germany, 2003-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 347, 353; Levanen v. Finland, App.
No. 34600/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 6– 7 (2006); Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, 2007-I, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 39, 63.
145. Stec and Others v. United Kingdom, 2006-VI, Eur. Ct. H.R. 321, 323; Andrejeva
v. Latvia, 2009-II, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 105; Moskal v. Poland, App. No. 10373/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1, 9 (2009).
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ciently established to be enforceable.”146
The Inter-American Court has defined the right to property as protect-
ing “those material things which can be possessed, as well as any right
which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept includes all mov-
ables and immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and any other
intangible object capable of having value.”147  This definition would
include rights to payment under contracts.  It is important to note that
although it may not be feasible to sue for third party deprivations of prop-
erty in any human rights forum, that does not mean that there is no human
right at stake: the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights dis-
cusses the obligation of businesses to prevent human rights violations and
to not commit human rights violations, and states are required to prevent
deprivations caused by third parties.148
2. Deprivation of Property via Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Credit
Contracts
In some cases, involving consumer challenges to fees or charges
assessed by consumer credit providers, the charges are essentially depriva-
tion of consumer’s property by theft— for example, wrongful overdraft
charges deducted directly from the consumer’s bank account.  Companies
have every incentive to wrongfully charge or deduct small amounts from
consumers, as consumers have no capacity or incentive to challenge these
practices.  It simply does not make sense to pay a $200 arbitration fee—
much less attorney’s fees— to recover a $50 wrongful overdraft charge,
much less smaller overages that consumers may not even notice, but that
add up to millions of wrongful gains for corporations.  If the contract
includes a mandatory arbitration clause and precludes class action, the
consumer will have no effective way to challenge this property deprivation.
Thus, the FAA permits deprivation of property without effective
recourse.  Even though it is not the state doing the taking, this is still a
human rights problem, because human rights principles place obligations
on third parties and require states to prevent deprivations caused by third
parties.149  That is not to say that one could achieve redress in a human
rights forum for such a violation, but nevertheless, in these cases, consum-
ers’ property rights have been violated.  Arbitration clauses effectively give
businesses the discretion to steal property with impunity; although the
state itself is not taking property, it is willing to enforce a contract that
facilitates theft and strips the remedy for redressing this theft.  That U.S.
146. Burdov v. Russia, 2009-I, Eur. Ct. H.R. 71, 95– 96; see also Stran Greek Refineries
& Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 22 (1994).
147. Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 79, para. 74 (Aug. 31, 2001), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/ser-
iec_79_ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6E7-BW3H].
148. U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/17/31, at 1 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/
GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AWR-WQPR].
149. See, e.g., id. at 5.
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law does not consider third party deprivations of property to be a constitu-
tional violation does not mean that human rights are not at issue.150  Simi-
larly, that arbitration has not been viewed as “state action”151 (despite
arguments that it should be),152 does not mean that no human rights viola-
tion has occurred.  Again, human rights principles are concerned with
third party violations of human rights— businesses may not arbitrarily take
property, and states may not permit businesses to do so.153  That there is
no enforceable human rights specific remedy does not mean that human
rights concerns do not apply.
B. Discrimination
1. Right to be Free from Discrimination Generally
Discrimination on the basis of any status is impermissible under
human rights law.  Under Article 26 of the ICCPR, all types of discrimina-
tion based on “any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status” are prohibited.154  Under Article 1 of the ACHR, convention parties
are obliged to “undertake to respect the rights and freedoms” specified and
to “ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exer-
cise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”155
Under Article 14 of the ECHR, protected rights and freedoms “shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth, or other status.”156
The European Court of Human Rights has held that distinction between
groups are permissible without a rational basis and without a “reasonable
relationship of proportionality” between the “means employed” and “object
sought.”157
Further, the U.S. has both signed and ratified the International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD),
which requires the United States to “[t]ake effective measures to review gov-
ernmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify
any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating
150. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2935– 36 (2015).
151. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1, 11
(2005).
152. Id. at 3.
153. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, FINDLAW, http://smallbusi-
ness.findlaw.com/business-finances/the-fair-debt-collection-practices-act.html [https://
perma.cc/4XGE-XWQH].
154. ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 26. R
155. ACHR, supra note 116, art. 1. R
156. ECHR, supra note 128, at 12 (art. 14). R
157. Religionsgemeinschaft Der Zeugen Jehovas v. Austria, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-88022 [https://perma.cc/P5XT-8YNB].
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racial discrimination wherever it exists.”158
A number of state and local human rights offices also focus on com-
batting discrimination.  In fact, non-discrimination may be their sole mis-
sion.  For example, the D.C. Office of Human Rights enforces D.C.’s non-
discrimination law, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of “actual
or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin,  sex, age, marital  status,
personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression,
family responsibilities, genetic information, disability, matriculation, or
political affiliation of any individual.”159  The New York Division of
Human Rights: protects individuals “from discrimination in areas such as
employment, education, credit, and purchasing or renting a home or com-
mercial space” based on a number of factors, including race, creed, color,
national origin, sexual orientation, military status, age, disability, marital
status, and prior arrest record.160  The Maine Human Rights Commission
enforces Maine’s anti-discrimination laws, which prevent discrimination
on the “basis of race, color, sex, sexual orientation, physical or mental disa-
bility, religion, ancestry or national origin.”161  In addition, of course, the
United States Constitution and many other state laws prevent discrimina-
tion without explicitly framing discrimination as a human rights issue.162
2. Discrimination in Mandatory Arbitration Under Consumer Credit
Contracts
The U.N. Human Rights Committee has expressed concerned with
lack of legal representation in civil proceedings, particularly where liti-
gants are racial, ethnic, and national minorities.163  In its response to this
questions raised in the Committee’s List of Issues, the United States cited
the work of the Department of Justice’s Access to Justice Initiative, which
was established in 2010 “to help the justice system efficiently deliver out-
comes that are fair and accessible to all, irrespective of wealth and sta-
tus.”164  Because mandatory arbitration clauses require even claims of race
discrimination, such as discriminatory lending practices, to be arbitrated,
the FAA may be a law that “has the effect of perpetuating racial discrimina-
158. United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination art. 2, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].
159. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.1; D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11.
160. How to File a Complaint, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, https://
dhr.ny.gov/complaint#howto [https://perma.cc/T5FT-E7LB]; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290
(McKinney 2017).
161. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4552 (2016).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Jack S. Vaitayanonta,
In State Legislatures We Trust? The “Compelling Interest” Presumption and Religious Free
Exercise Challenges to State Civil Rights Laws, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 886, 886 (2001)
(“While the federal government has traditionally taken the lead in promoting and enforc-
ing civil rights legislation, state governments have become aggressive pioneers in fash-
ioning new antidiscrimination laws that have pushed civil rights protections into
previously unexplored territory.”).
163. U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues in Relation to the Fourth Periodic Report
of the United States of America, P8(e) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/4 (Apr. 29, 2013).
164. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Replies of the United States of America to the List of
Issues, P29 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/4/Add.1 (Sept. 13, 2013).
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tion.”  Under the existing arbitration system, discriminatory conduct on
behalf of providers of consumer financial products cannot be effectively
challenged.
In addition, human rights discrimination principles require any differ-
entiation in treatment of two groups to at least be justified by a rational
basis.  For example, Ecuador successfully alleged in human rights court
that Spain’s foreclosure laws discriminate against debtors by limiting the
defenses against foreclosure available to debtors.  The FAA, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court, discriminates against consumers and debtors in
favor of companies drafting the arbitration clauses.165  As such, if consum-
ers are uniformly deprived of rights that companies are granted (for exam-
ple, less access to discovery, as discussed below), this would be
impermissible under human rights principles.
C. Due Process
1. Process Rights as Human Rights Generally
Human rights instruments require a fair trial to determine matters
concerning rights or obligations; this includes both debtors’ and creditors’
property interests, privacy concerns, and challenges to discrimination.166
The ACHR, ECHR, and ICCPR all include rights to prompt and fair trials
conducted by an “independent and impartial tribunal.”167  The ACHR and
ICCPR additionally require that the tribunal be “competent.”  This right of
access includes the right to a public hearing,168 the right to an indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal,169 and the right to delivery of justice in “a
reasonable time” and fair manner.170  In determining whether a tribunal is
independent, the European Court of Human Rights considers (1) the man-
ner of appointment of its members, (2) the duration of their office, (3) the
existence of guarantees against outside pressures, and (4) the question of
165. See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); see also
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343– 44 (2011).
166. Ondersma, supra note 91, at 335. R
167. ACHR, supra note 116, art. 8 (“Every person has the right to a hearing, with due R
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial
tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a
criminal nature made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations
of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.”); ICCPR, supra note 100, at art. 14 (“Fair R
and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by
law” required in the determination of rights and obligations); ECHR, supra note 128, at R
9 (art. 6) (“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations . . . everyone is enti-
tled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impar-
tial tribunal established by law.”).
168. Fredin v. Sweden (No. 2), 1994 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20-22; Axen v. Germany, 1983 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 25.
169. See Bridnicka v. Poland, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 139; D.N. v. Switzerland, 2001-III
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 13-14; McGonnell v. United Kingdom, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 107;
Daktaras v. Lithuania, 2000-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 489; Sander v. United Kingdom, 2000-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. 243.
170. Robins v. United Kingdom, App. No. 22410/93, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 527, 537
(1998).
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whether the body presents an appearance of independence.171
Fair trial rights also include the right to equality before courts and
tribunals.172  This includes rights of equal access to courts and the right to
“equality of arms.”173  Equality of arms “means that the same procedural
rights are to be provided to all the parties unless distinctions are based on
law and can be justified on objective and reasonable grounds.”174  “The
principle of equality between parties applies also to civil proceedings, and
demands, inter alia, that each side be given the opportunity to contest all
the arguments and evidence adduced by the other party.”175  At least as
interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights, fair trial rights
include a right of access to a court in decisions involving civil rights and
obligations.176  Although human rights instruments do not guarantee any
specific contract or property, once a state has established the scope of such
rights, these rights cannot be deprived without a fair, impartial, and com-
petent tribunal.
Human rights principles permit parties to waive their right to a court
provided such waiver is not coerced,177 is unequivocal,178 and includes
“minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance.”179  Importantly,
however, the right to a fair and impartial tribunal cannot be waived.180
2. Mandatory Arbitration and Due Process
Human rights principles require that consumers have an option to
have their civil rights and obligations determined by an independent,
impartial, and competent tribunal in a public hearing.  This applies to dis-
putes involving property rights as well as contractual obligations.181
171. Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, App. Nos. 7819/77, 7878/77, 7 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 165, 198– 99 (1984).
172. ICCPR, supra note 100 art.14. R
173. Delcourt v. Belgium, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 350 (ser. A), 355, 367 (1970).
174. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 32 to Article 14: Right to
Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, P13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/
32 (Aug. 23, 2007), https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom32.html
[https://perma.cc/29E7-Z6EL] [hereinafter General Comment No. 32]; see Jixi Zhang,
Fair Trial Rights in the ICCPR, 2 J. POL. & L. 39, 39– 40 (2009).
175. General Comment No. 32, supra note 174, at para. 13; see Human Rights R
Comm., Jansen-Gielen v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 846/1999, P8.2 U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/71/D/846/1999, (2001); Human Rights Comm., Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi
v. Finland, Communication No. 779/1997, P7.4 (2001).
176. McGregor, supra note 126, at 623 (citing Golder v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. R
H.R. (ser. A) 524, 536– 37 (1975)).
177. See Deweer v. Belgium, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439, 460– 61 (1980).
178. Poitrimol v. France, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 130, 145 (1993); Pfeifer and Plankl v. Aus-
tria, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 692, 712 (1992); Oberschlick v. Austria, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. 389, 420
(1991).
179. Suovaniemi v. Finland, App. No. 31737/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999).
180. Pfeifer, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 713; Shirley Shipman, Waiver: Canute against the Tide,
32 CIV. JUST. Q. 470, 480 (2013); see also Suovaniemi; Suda v. Czech Republic, App. No.
1643/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010) (documenting the ECtHR applying these principles to
arbitration).
181. See Demanda Ante El Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Ecuador v. Spain
[Demand before the European Court of Human Rights, Ecuador v. Spain] (suit filed by
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Hence, creditors attempting to enforce their contractual rights must give
debtors the right to defend against accusations of default before a fair and
impartial tribunal, and debtors as well as creditors should be able to com-
plain of property deprivations before a fair and impartial tribunal as well.
In addition, charges of discrimination stemming from consumer credit
contracts must be heard by a fair and impartial tribunal.182
If arbitration is the only recourse for consumers, the arbitration pro-
cess would have to comply with due process rights.  Under EU human
rights law, if a state “formally diverts a dispute to arbitration, it would have
to comply with the standards of Article 6(1), including an impartial tribu-
nal and public hearing.”183
Arbitration of consumer credit disputes are not public hearings; most
arbitration proceedings are kept confidential.  The CFPB only gained
access to some aspects of some arbitration proceedings because the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) agreed to provide the information.184
Even that information was limited, however, as many cases ended in settle-
ments and few details about such settlements are available.185
Not only are arbitration proceedings not public hearings, but a num-
ber of studies and reports also cast serious doubt on the fairness, imparti-
ality, and competence of arbitrators in many cases.  First, the “manner of
appointment” of arbitrators is problematic— the business can choose the
arbitral organization that will handle arbitration, and arbitrators working
for that organization may have an incentive to toe the line so as not to cost
the arbitral organization business (by the business designating a different
arbitral organization in the contract).  In interviews with reporters, over
three dozen arbitrators confessed that they felt beholden to companies and
feared losing business.186  Arbitration proceedings also often lack any
“appearance of independence.”  A Harvard law professor, Elizabeth
Bartholet, told Times reporters she overheard two individuals discussing
how one arbitrator nearly caused the firm to lose a lucrative client, presum-
ably due to an unfavorable ruling.187  Based on records and interviews, the
Times concluded that “companies can steer cases to friendly arbitrators”
Ecuador against Spain for deprivations of the human rights of Ecuadorian citizens living
in Spain under Spain’s foreclosure system).
182. Ecuador v. Spain, Eur. Ct. H.R 26 (2013) (citing H. Lauterpacht, International
Law and Human Rights, Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos, el Tribunal de
Estrasburgo y su jurisprudencia, 155); for a description of the case, see Sonya Dowsett,




183. McGregor, supra note 126, at 627.
184. CFPB Arbitration Study, supra note 22, § 1, at 7– 8. R
185. Id. § 4.9, at 21.
186. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of
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and “some arbitrators cultivate close ties with companies to get busi-
ness.”188  Interviews included stories of company lawyers going to a bas-
ketball game with the arbitrator in the case, and a plaintiff who was upset
to see the company lawyer and arbitrator return from a lunch break in
“matching silver sports cars.”189  As one appellate judge explained, “[t]his
is a business and arbitrators have an economic reason to decide in favor of
the repeat players.”190
Bias in favor of repeat players is well documented.  Lisa Bingham con-
ducted a series of studies in the 1990s designed to evaluate the effect of
repeat players in the arbitration system in employment cases.191  She found
that, when arbitrating against employers who arbitrated more than once,
employees were significantly less likely to win, and when they did win were
awarded significantly lower damages than employees arbitrating against
non-repeat employers.192  Specifically, she found that employees recovered
a median of twenty-eight percent and a mean of forty-eight percent of
claims against non-repeat player defendants, compared to a median of zero
percent and a mean of eleven percent of claims against repeat player
defendants. Employees won damages in over seventy percent of cases
against non-repeat players— but only won damages in sixteen percent of
cases against repeat players.193
In a 2007 study of California AAA arbitration cases, Alexander Colvin
found similar evidence of bias in favor of repeat players.194  Employees
won thirty-two percent of the time against non-repeat employers, and only
13.9% of the time against repeat player employers.  Further, employees won
only 11.3% of the time where the case involved both a repeat player-
employer and a repeat arbitrator.195  If the case involved a repeat employer
and a repeat arbitrator and the employee was unrepresented by counsel, the
employee won in only two percent of such cases.196
A 2015 study of 5000 also found that consumers facing repeat play-
ers— particularly “super repeat” players who defend against large numbers
of arbitration actions perhaps designed to substitute for class actions after




191. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223,
235 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 206 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, Employment Arbitration];
Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at
Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108, 115 & tbl.5 (1996); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in
Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes,
6 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369, 374– 83 (1995).
192. Bingham, Employment Arbitration, supra note 191, at 209– 10. R
193. Id. at 232.
194. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 408 (2007).
195. Id. at 430.
196. Id. at 434.
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consumers facing one-shot defendants.”197  It is also worth noting that,
although some plaintiff’s lawyers are repeat players, they do not enjoy any
repeat player advantage— in fact, these cases are less likely to result in a
result favorable to the consumer.198
The Federal Trade Commission has acknowledged that bias and the
appearance of bias in arbitration is a substantial problem, and set out to
evaluate this issue in a 2010 round table and report.  The FTC focused on
two potential areas of bias: the individual conduct of the arbitrator, and the
arbitration forum as a whole.199  In assessing individual arbitrator bias, the
FTC suggested that the manner in which arbitrators are paid may be con-
ducive to bias.  According to participants in the roundtable discussion,
“payment per matter provides arbitrators with an incentive to spend too
little time on each matter; payment of a fixed salary provides an incentive
for arbitrators not to be efficient.”200  In its report, the FTC concluded that
because “arbitrators generally are paid per matter, [they] have a financial
incentive not to engage in conduct that would result in them receiving
fewer cases.201  The FTC report also noted that the skewed success rates
for creditors in arbitration cases is suggestive of bias.  The report cited a
Public Citizen study finding that “collectors and creditors succeeded in at
least ninety-four percent of these arbitrations,” and that “arbitrators who
decided in favor of firms, as opposed to consumers, subsequently received
more matters from the arbitration forum.”202
In addition to raising concerns about bias of individual arbitrators, the
FTC report also suggested that issues of fairness may arise “if a party with
matters before an arbitration forum has financial ties to the forum.”203  In
2009, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), which represented itself as an
impartial entity, failed to disclose that it had significant financial ties to
leaders of the debt collection industry.204  While NAF ceased operations
after an investigation of the Minnesota Attorney General, concerns about
financial incentives remain.  For example, one round table member sug-
gested that because arbitrators were paid by creditors or collectors for sal-
ary, expenses, and control their work flow, they are more likely to favor
their “employers”.205  Roundtable participants suggested that a not-for-
profit status would help to ameliorate these issues, but certainly not elimi-
197. David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 104, 113– 15 (2015) (“consumer win
rate was forty-two percent against one-shotters but just thirty-one percent against repeat
players (p<.0001)”).
198. Id. at 115– 16.
199. F.T.C., REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION




201. Id. at 48.
202. Id. at 48– 49.
203. Id. at 51.
204. Id. at ii.
205. Id. at 51.
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nate them.206  Even when the entity is a non-profit, creditors create the
terms of the arbitration agreement and pay for the costs associated with
arbitration, and thus the risk of bias is not eliminated.207
In addition to this evidence of bias and the unequal distribution of
resources, consumers also do not have the opportunity to conduct discov-
ery in arbitration cases.208  This denies them the opportunity to gather and
present evidence that may be essential to recovery.  In some cases, the
defense has withheld crucial evidence— even destroying records in one
case.209  Although arbitrators do give some minimal access to discovery,
they typically do not permit depositions.210  Although limitations on dis-
covery viewed in isolation may not seem problematic, when combined with
the repeat-payer effect and the lack of transparency and public record, it is
doubtful that anything resembling due process is achieved.  Because these
practices occur in arbitration proceedings rather than civil court, plaintiffs
are not able to appeal and challenge such violations of process.  By condon-
ing system in which such proceedings are consumers’ only recourse, the
FAA runs afoul of due process obligations.
Finally, the CFPB’s finding that three out of four consumers had no
idea they were subjected to arbitration proceedings at the time they signed
the contract suggests that this is hardly a voluntary waiver of trial
rights.211  And even consumers who are aware of the arbitration provisions
seldom have an opportunity to opt-out of the clause— it is a condition of
using the service.  As these clauses are adopted by more and more con-
sumer credit providers, the effect is that waiver of fair trial is essentially a
condition of using any consumer credit product, which cannot be accept-
able from a human rights standpoint.
D. Effectiveness of Remedies
Closely related to due process rights is the assurance in international
human rights instruments of an “effective” remedy or recourse for the
redress of violations of the protected human rights.212  For example, the
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 197, at 65. R
209. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of
the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/
business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://
perma.cc/Z7W6-2ELD].
210. See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, American
Arbitration Association R.23 (2013).
211. George H. Friedman, CFPB Issues Final Report on Arbitration, Telegraphing a Ban
or Limits on Arbitration. Should SEC follow Suit?, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR (Mar. 16,
2015), http://www.sacarbitration.com/blog/cfpb-issues-final-report-arbitration-
telegraphing-ban-limits-arbitration-sec-follow-suit/ [https://perma.cc/UFZ4-K8E5].
212. See, e.g., ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 64– 65 (2011) (“Article 8(1) is thus, in the correct understanding
of the Court, ineluctably linked to the right to an effective domestic remedy under Arti-
cle 25 of the Convention;” for “true judicial guarantees to exist in a process’ the obser-
vance is necessary of ‘all the requisites’ that serve to ‘secure the titularity or the exercise
of a right.’”) (quoting IACTHR, THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON CONSULAR ASSISTANCE IN
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ACHR provides for “simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that
violate his fundamental rights . . . ”213  Signatories of the ACHR also agree
to ensure the enforcement of remedies granted.214  The ECHR similarly
requires “an effective remedy before a national authority” for those whose
Convention rights have been violated.215  Likewise, signatories to the
ICCPR agree to “adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect” to Covenant rights and to provide for an “effective remedy” for
the violation of the rights.216  The Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) of the United Nations has ruled that Spain’s fore-
closure laws resulted in a lack of effective access to the courts to protect the
right to adequate housing.217
Human rights bodies have discussed the importance of access to coun-
sel in preserving rights.  The Human Rights Committee has repeatedly
called for states to provide counsel in a variety of civil cases, including
discrimination, land disputes, and housing cases.  For example, in discuss-
ing the Czech Republic’s compliance with the Covenant in the context of
housing discrimination against the Roma, the Committee concluded that
the Czech Republic should ‘provide legal aid for victims of discrimina-
tion.”218  The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing concluded
that eviction proceedings without civil representation violate human
rights.219  The European Court of Human Rights has also discussed the
THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW (Oct 1, 1999) (explaining that “for the ‘due
process of law’ to exist it is necessary that a justiciable can vindicate his rights and
defend his interests in an effective way and in conditions of procedural equality with
other justiciables.”).
213. ACHR, supra note 116, art. 25. R
214. Id. art. 1.
215. ECHR, supra note 128, at 9 (art. 6). R
216. ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 2, §2– 3. R
217. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Communication No. 2/
2014, E/C.12/55/D/2/2014.
218. U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations— Czech
Republic, P16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/2 (2007); see also Kaufman, Davis &
Wegleitner, supra note 55, at 779 n. 19 (“In commenting on Sweden’s treatment of its R
indigenous Sámi population, the Committee recommended that the government provide
adequate legal aid to Sámi villages in land rights disputes . . . The Committee has made
similar recommendations with regard to treatment of asylum seekers by the govern-
ments in Switzerland and El Salvador.  With regard to Switzerland, Committee recom-
mended that ‘the State party should review its legislation in order to grant free legal
assistance to asylum-seekers during all asylum procedures, whether ordinary or
extraordinary.” U.N. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations—
Switzerland, para. 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHE/CO/3 (2009).  With regard to El Salva-
dor, the Committee recommended that the government “ensure that persons subject to
deportation proceedings benefit from an effective right to be heard, to have an adequate
defence and to request that their case be reviewed by a competent authority.” U.N. Rep.
of the Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observation— El Salvador, P17, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6 (2010).”).
219. Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Report on Adequate Housing as a Com-
ponent of the Right to an Adequate Standard of Living, and on the Right to Non-Discrimina-
tion in this Context, P68– 69, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/46 (Dec. 24, 2012) (by Raquel
Rolnik).
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impact of cost of litigation on access to justice, reasoning that where impo-
sition of fees preclude effective access to the courts, such costs are incon-
sistent with human rights obligations.220  The U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Extreme Poverty and Human Rights commented on the link between pov-
erty and lack of access to counsel: “[a]ccess to justice is a human right in
itself, and essential for tackling the root causes of poverty . . . Lack of legal
aid for civil matters can seriously prejudice the rights and interests of per-
sons living in poverty, for example when they are unable to contest tenancy
disputes [and] eviction decisions.”221  Relatedly, the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination protects a right to coun-
sel in civil cases where absence of counsel has a disparate impact on racial,
ethnic, or national minorities.222  The Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination criticized the U.S. for racial disparities in civil pro-
tection due to the failure to ensure counsel in civil cases.  The Committee
recommended that the U.S. “allocate sufficient resources to ensure legal
representation of indigent persons belonging to racial, ethnic and national
minorities in civil proceedings, with particular regard to those proceedings
where basic human needs, such as housing, health care, or child custody,
are at stake.”223
1. Effective Remedies and Arbitration in Consumer Credit Contracts
Binding, mandatory arbitration prevents many from enforcing their
rights, including rights to be protected from discrimination and property
deprivation.  As we have seen, there is limited opportunity for consumers
to appeal, even when the arbitration proceedings have been a legal process
that is anything but due; for example, in cases involving the destruction of
evidence.
Although there has been limited human rights specific case law on the
issue of arbitration, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has
decided a case involving mandatory but non-binding arbitration.  The
Court concluded that mandatory arbitration was permissible where the
settlement was non-binding and parties were able to access courts within
thirty days of arbitration.224  In reaching its conclusion, the CJEU noted
that, when interpreting Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has reasoned that “fundamental rights do not con-
stitute unfettered prerogatives and may be restricted, provided that the
220. Kreuz v. Poland, App. No. 28249/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 66 (2001); Ait-Mouhoub
v. France, App. No. 103/1997/887/1099, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998); Apostol v. Georgia, App.
No. 40765/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 65 (2006).
221. Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, para. 62, U.N. Doc. A/67/278 (August
9, 2012) (Magdalena Sepúlveda Carmona).
222. ICERD, supra note 158, art. 5, 6. R
223. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by State Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, Concluding Observations,
P22, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (Feb. 2008).
224. Case C-317/08, Rosalba Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02213,
paras. 54– 55; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000/C L 364/
01
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restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued by
the measures in question and that they do not involve, with regard to the
objectives pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference which
infringes upon the very substance of the rights guaranteed.”225  As Lorna
McGregor explained, CJEU “appears to be suggesting that the key factors
on whether mandatory engagement with agreement-based ADR/PDR vio-
lates Article 6(1) turns on the length process; on the requirement to pay
fees (which is particularly relevant if it means that the parties cannot
advance their claim to a court where agreement fails) and on whether the
party can subsequently lodge a case in the national courts where the pro-
cess has failed.”226
Of course, the arbitration in consumer credit contracts at issue here is
both binding and mandatory, which would be inconsistent with the availa-
bility of an effective remedy by human rights standards, at least as articu-
lated by the CJEU.  There is no actual alternative remedy in national courts
if arbitration is unsuccessful in these cases; claimants have no alternative
recourse.
As discussed in the introduction, to the extent that arbitration clauses
cut off class actions, this may mean that a variety of human rights viola-
tions, from discrimination to property deprivation, lack effective redress.
Particularly where the property deprivation is a relatively small amount, it
is simply not feasible to bring an action to recover these funds.  It is simply
not worthwhile for an individual to sue for such small amounts.  As one
federal judge has observed, “The realistic alternative to a class action is not
17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a
fanatic sues for $30.”227  Even where harm is substantial, individuals may
lack the recourses to challenge such wrongs.  The concerns about inequal-
ity in situations involving lack of access to counsel also apply to
mandatory, binding arbitration.  Practically, for many of these deprivations
and violations, class actions may be the only way for the deprivations
described here to achieve redress: that is, remedies may not be effective
absent class action opportunities.
Further, some arbitration clauses prohibit not just class actions but
any aggregation method— further placing effective remedy out of reach.
The contract at issue in Italian Colors included a prohibition on any plain-
tiff’s counsel sharing resources, as well as prohibiting issue preclusion for
prior awards, meaning that the liability would need to be litigated from
scratch even where liability for a specific wrongdoing had already been
established.228  The arbitration procedures do not allow for a fair playing
225. Case C-317/08, Rosalba Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02213,
para. 63; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 2000/C L 364/01.
226. McGregor, supra note 126, at 624– 25. R
227. Carnegie v. Household Int’l. Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
228. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); David S. Schwartz, Under-
standing Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and Preclusion Prin-
ciples, 38 U.S.F.L. REV. 49, 60 (2016).
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field on which consumers can enforce their rights, and access to justice is
out of reach.
III. The CFPB Proposal and Human Rights
Viewed from a human rights lens, the CFPB Proposal went a long way
toward promoting human rights.  To recap, the proposal prohibited class
action bans in arbitration clauses— although permitting the class action to
be mandated to take place within arbitration.  The proposal also included
requirements that arbitrators disclose the results of cases, enabling better
monitoring.  The availability of class actions likely means that more con-
sumers would have been able to access remedies for wrongs that implicate
human rights.  As discussed, absent the availability of class actions, claims
involving discrimination or deprivation of property often have no redress.
Preventing arbitration clauses from precluding class actions would have
given consumers the possibility of achieving redress without incurring up-
front costs.  As discussed, if consumers are forced to bear the costs of pur-
suing their claims, they may not be able to do so, or may have no incentive
to do so where the damages in each case are small.  This means that human
rights violations such as discrimination or wrongful deprivation of prop-
erty can continue undeterred and without a remedy that is due process
compliant.
Although the CFPB proposal would have been a substantial improve-
ment from the status quo, it would not have alleviated all human rights
concerns.  Because the entire process may still take place within arbitra-
tion, if the arbitration process does not meet due process— for example if
the arbitrator is not impartial, or if there is no equality of arms— there still
would not have been an adequate remedy available for human rights
wrongs.  Evidence suggests that the existing arbitration process is far from
meeting due process and fair trial standards.229  The increased monitoring
of arbitration proceedings might have helped bring the arbitration process
closer to satisfying due process obligations, but it would not have man-
dated a fully public process and fully transparent proceedings.  In addition,
the proposal did not speak to concerns regarding equality of arms issues—
there was no explicit requirement that consumers have equal access to dis-
covery, for example.  Thus, had the proposal gone into effect, the CFPB
should have focused its monitoring efforts on evaluating the extent to
which arbitration proceedings satisfy due process concerns.  For example,
the CFPB could have requested reports regarding the nature of discovery
made available to each side— this need not require disclosure of the sub-
stance of the discovery produced.
Even if the arbitration process had improved under this proposal, it
may still have been problematic that parties could be both forced to arbi-
trate and that the results of the arbitration may be binding and final with
no access to national courts.  If parties could promptly appeal arbitration
229. Arbitration Agreement: Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,829 (proposed May 24,
2016) (rejected by joint resolution of Congress).
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results to district courts, this would go a long way toward satisfying due
process concerns.  The FTC roundtable discussed above resulted in some
proposed solutions to the matter of bias and appearance of bias in arbitra-
tion: for example, roundtable participants suggested that arbitration
forums “diversify their rosters of arbitrators, rotate matters randomly
among arbitrators, and limit the number of matters each arbitrator han-
dles.”  In addition, the FTC suggested that “forums should develop, adopt,
and vigorously enforce standards prohibiting bias and the appearance of
bias for themselves and their arbitrators.”  Lastly, participants suggested
policies that require more transparency in the arbitrator selection process.
In monitoring arbitrators, the CFPB could request more information about
arbitrator selection, and could propose standards that limit bias and the
appearance of bias, such as prohibiting communication between ex parte
communication between the arbitrator and either party.
Precisely because it is unlikely that the arbitration process will imme-
diately transform to satisfy human rights concerns, the CFPB must con-
tinue to be empowered to enforce violations of consumer financial
protection laws.  As the Wells Fargo multiple accounts scandal makes clear,
the absence of such enforcement would leave deprivations of rights un-
remedied.
Human rights and other advocacy organizations could also challenge
mandatory arbitration in two ways: First, they could put pressure on Con-
gress by detailing the ways in which the FAA violates human rights obliga-
tions.  Although this is unlikely to be immediately successful in light of the
current congressional make-up, it is important to have reform proposals at
the ready when the window of opportunity arises.  Second, such organiza-
tions could attempt to apply pressure on companies directly, arguing that
their mandatory arbitration clauses violate their obligation to respect and
promote human rights under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, proposed by John Ruggie and endorsed by the UN Human
Rights Council in 2011.230 Subsequently, the Human Rights Council
established a Working Group charged with “disseminating and implement-
ing” the Guiding Principles.231  Under the Guiding Principles, businesses
are expected to “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights
impacts through their own activities” and to “address such impacts when
they occur.”232  In addition, they should prevent human rights harms
“directly linked” to their operations, even if they do not cause them.233
Because human rights obligations of businesses should be proportional to
their “size and circumstances,” large entities will have greater obligations
230. See Operationalize the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
ACTION2020, http://action2020.org/business-solutions/operationalize-the-un-guiding-
principles-on-business-and-human [https://perma.cc/57G2-S9PA].
231. Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS (June 2001), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8BKX-9Y88].
232. ACTION2020, supra note 230. R
233. Id.
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consistent with their greater capacity to address adverse human rights con-
sequences.234  To meet their obligations, business entities should under-
take policy commitments, should engage in due diligence, and should
develop a process for remediation of harms.235  Consumers have the capac-
ity to punish companies that do not satisfy human rights obligations.  Con-
sumer power has been on particular display lately: faced with boycotts,
advertisers have fled Breitbart,236 and Travis Kalanick resigned from his
position on Trump’s economic advisory board.237  Wells Fargo has also
been shaken by boycotts of customers, particularly the cities of Seattle and
Davis who chose to divest from the bank due to its ties with private prisons
and the North Dakota Access Pipeline project.238
Finally, individual states can also play a role in curbing the human
rights concerns around mandatory arbitration.239  First, states themselves
can agree to human rights provisions even though the U.S. is not obligated.
Second, states can enact their own consumer protection laws to mitigate
some of the damage caused by mandatory arbitration; states can also
endeavor to limit the damage of mandatory arbitration with robust uncon-
scionability limits to contract.  Although states cannot target mandatory
arbitration clauses directly, they can provide robust consumer protections
under general contract law and consumer law statutes.  To the extent that
arbitration clauses are enforced and states are not able to limit them, states
can take their own enforcement action against predatory practices.  This is
not a substitute for due process, but at least is diligent pursuit of an effec-
tive remedy while awaiting human rights compliance at the national level.
Conclusion
The existing mandatory, binding arbitration system for consumer
credit contracts is inconsistent with human rights.  Consumers subject to
these clauses lack access to a fair tribunal in which to challenge property
deprivations and discrimination.  Access to class actions in arbitration pro-
ceedings, which the CFPB proposal would have required, may bring us
closer to satisfying some of these concerns, but only if the process actually
amounts to an independent and impartial tribunal.  Perhaps, rather than
the company selecting its arbitration organization, arbitration organiza-
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Aimee Picchi, As Breitbart Wages “War” on Kellogg’s, Advertisers Flee, CBS NEWS
(Dec. 2, 2016, 8:41 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/as-breitbart-wages-war-on-kel
loggs-advertisers-flee/ [https://perma.cc/C5AV-5AFQ].
237. Andrew Blake, Uber CEO resigns from Trump advisory council over executive
order, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/
3/travis-kalanick-uber-ceo-resigns-trump-advisory-co/ [https://perma.cc/E9FZ-BCDF].
238. Bill Chappell, 2 Cities To Pull More Than $3 Billion From Wells Fargo Over Dakota
Access Pipeline, NPR (Feb. 8, 2017, 2:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/02/08/514133514/two-cities-vote-to-pull-more-than-3-billion-from-wells-fargo-ov
er-dakota-pipelin [https://perma.cc/QPE7-3TVA].
239. Peter Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567,
569 (1997).
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tions could be appointed randomly.240  It would also mitigate human
rights concerns if consumers had access to an appeal, although actual
access would require an affordable appeals process, including robust
access to non-profit legal services.  In addition, human rights principles
suggest that the public should have access to the proceedings.  The human
rights analysis here can be useful regardless of which reforms, if any, are
passed: human rights organizations and activists can call on consumer
financial credit providers to comply with human rights principles by ensur-
ing that consumers are able to effectively achieve redress in situations of
property deprivation or discrimination.  Such organizations can also ana-
lyze which providers of consumer financial products come closest to com-
plying with human rights principles, and can publicize the results of this
research— enabling consumers to choose products based upon this infor-
mation.  This can generate economic pressure to comply with the human
rights principles discussed here.
The CFPB proposal would have been an important step in better pro-
tecting consumers’ human rights.  In addition, this analysis suggests that,
in an era when businesses look to mandatory arbitration as a method for
circumventing consumers’ rights, it is essential that the CFPB continue to
be empowered to deploy their enforcement authority to hold businesses
accountable for violations of these rights.
240. This is similar to the suggestion that ratings agencies be randomly appointed to
resolve the problem of ratings agencies lowering standards to please the issuers who pay
them. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, A Better Way to Run Rating Agencies, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
17, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304572204579
503471330762810 [https://perma.cc/754R-DYLK].
